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Abstract: 
 
This paper is based upon ongoing theoretical work by the author. A 
growing number of academics are starting to problematise social work 
within a risk paradigm by highlighting the impact this has on how service 
user's experiences are atomised into units of risk, rather than having their 
needs understood as members of families and communities. This paper 
seeks to develop this discussion by offering a theoretical examination of 
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risk from a phenomenological perspective by unpacking some of the 
ƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƌŝƐŬ ?hƐŝŶŐ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌ
attempts to first of all undertake an ontology of risk and then to examine 
its usefulness in the UK child protection context. The author argues that 
working within a risk paradigm obscures rather than clarifies 
understanding. The approach is rooted in an argument that 
'phenomenology' is the natural home of social work which is interested in 
the lived exƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐŽƌ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ-in-the-
ǁŽƌůĚ ? ? 
 
Introduction: 
 
Often in social work we reify risk by constructing it as a monster 
(Featherstone et al, 2016) that needs feeding data and the social work task 
becomes satiating this monster with a regular diet of reporting. However, 
we rarely fully describe this monster  W does it have fangs, how sharp are 
its claws? My argument is that risk ŝƐŶ ?ƚƚŚĞŵŽŶƐƚĞƌŝƚƐĞůĨďƵƚĂ fog that 
shrouds us and, in that fog, we allow our imaginations to build a beast to 
rail against. By returniŶŐ ‘ƚŽƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŐƐŝŶƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? (Husserl, cited in 
Roche, 1973:27) I hope to describe it and consider its usefulness or 
otherwise in relation to the humane task of keeping children safe. 
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Risk is a murky business. It sits like a fog on the hills that we drive across, 
creating a persistent state of anxiety about what lies around the corner. 
zĞƚŝƚŝƐŶ ?ƚƚŚĞĨŽŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐĂƌŝƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽĐƌĂƐŚŝŶƚŽbut the oncoming lorry 
or the sheep in the middle of the road. WŚĂƚǁĞĨĞĂƌŝƐŶ ?ƚƚŚĞĨŽŐitself 
which merely makes us anxious about the potential for something to go 
wrong at some point in time. This may heighten our awareness of 
potential hazards and it may cause us to drive more slowly. However, if we 
are late for work it may not. We chance it and live with the anxiety that it 
causes us leading to nausea and stress or an adrenalin buzz. What we 
ought to do is slow down and spend more time looking for the hazards 
that may be around the corner. What we do is try to arrive in time in a 
state of anxiety not seeing the things that may cause harm. 
 
In severe danger of taking the analogy too far, this paper is an attempt to 
ƚƵƌŶƚŚĞĨŽŐůŝŐŚƚƐŽŶ ?/ŝŶƚĞŶĚƚŽƐŚŝŶĞĂďƌŝŐŚƚůŝŐŚƚŽŶ ‘ƌŝƐŬ ?ĂŶĚƐĞĞǁŚĂƚ
it is made of and try to understand what its impact is upon child protection 
social work practice in the UK ƵƐŝŶŐĂƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?&Žƌ Q 
 
 ? ?ĂƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇĐĂƌƌŝĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝƐƚŚĞƚƌƵůǇƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů
ontology, as over against the only illusory all-embracing ontology in 
positivity  ? and precisely for this reason it overcomes the dogmatic 
one-sidedness and hence unintelligibility of the latter, while at the 
same time it comprises within itself the truly legitimate content [of an 
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ontology in positivity] as grounded originally in intentional 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?,ƵƐƐĞƌů, cited in Welton, 1999:333) 
 
I have previously attempted a phenomenological exploration of forms of 
knowledge in child protection practice (Smeeton, 2015), which in the end 
looked more like an epistemology of child protection than a 
phenomenology in the Husserlian sense. In order to reseat myself back 
into this phenomenological tradition I intend to remind myself of 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶƚŽĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐǇǁŚŝĐŚ ? ?ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇƐŚĂƌƉĞŶƐƚŚĞ
knife but never gets rouŶĚƚŽĐƵƚƚŝŶŐ ? (Heidegger, cited in Inwood, 1997) 
and to initially focus on the ontology of risk, before considering the impact 
of risk on the lived experiences of the actors in the performance of child 
protection social work; i.e. children, their parents, social workers, the 
social work agency and wider society. 
 
/ǁŝůůĂůƐŽĚƌĂǁƵƉŽŶƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƚĂŬĞŶŵĂŝŶůǇĨƌŽŵĞĐŬ ?Ɛ
descriptions (1992 and 2007) of the risk society and I will set out some 
definitions to align the reader to the current context of child protection 
social work and how risk features there. We also need to be clear about 
the different ways to think about what is happening to children and the 
constituent factors, that seem to have been wrapped up into the neat little 
ƉĂĐŬĂŐĞŽĨ ‘ƌŝƐŬ ?ƐŽ/ǁŝůůƐƉĞŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƵŶǁƌĂƉƉŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĂŶĚůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚ
ƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ ‘ŚĂƌŵƐ ? ? ‘ŚĂǌĂƌĚƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶĞĞĚƐ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ‘ƌŝƐŬ ?
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which is in fact simply a calculation of the possibility for a hazard to cause 
harm. 
 
I also intend to consider how risk is written about and how it features in 
the academic social work literature primarily but also in the wider 
discourses about child protection that permeate society  W especially 
following child death tragedies for these litter the social work landscape 
with pitfalls for practice. I will posit an argument that the profession is 
engaged in a process of risk reification which is problematic and shrouds 
out understanding and meaning. Through risk reification the probability of 
harm becomes the object that falls under our gaze rather than the harm 
itself or the potential hazards that might cause the harm. We speak of 
families where there is a lot of risk or social workers carrying too much 
risk. How do we carry too much risk? Can we physically or cognitively hold 
a possibility? Our professional knowledge seems to have become that of 
managing risk rather than understanding what contributes to hazards or 
harm. Have we therefore developed as experts in the avoidance of 
likelihood? 
 
My tacit understanding is that risk is approached as if it is a thing that 
exists in the world and the job of the social worker is to understand and 
deal with this thing in order to keep children safe. The paper therefore 
seeks to explore the thingness ŽĨƌŝƐŬĚƌĂǁŝŶŐƵƉŽŶ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇŝŶ ‘ĞŝŶŐĂŶĚdŝŵĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/ŶĚŽŝŶŐƐŽ/ŚŽƉĞƚŽ
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ƉŝĐŬƵƉ,ƵƐƐĞƌů ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇas being the way to do 
ontology.  
 
I will attempt to discuss the usefulness of risk as a construct as either 
present-to-hand or ready-to-hand using Heidegger. I will expand on 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ whether risk is a conspicuous, obtrusive or 
obstinate construct within child protection social work. I will then go on to 
consider who experiences risk and how does this experience of risk affect 
ƚŚĞůŝĨĞǁŽƌůĚƐŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?/ǁŝůůĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƌŝƐŬŝƐŶ ?ƚĞǆƉĞƌŝenced by 
children but is in fact experienced by the professionals involved in making 
decisions. 
 
 ?'ƌŽƉŝŶŐďŽƵƚ ?ĨŽƌƌŝƐŬŝŶƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌŬ 
 
 “dŚĞŚŝƐƚory of philosophy bears witness how, with regard to the 
horizon essentially necessary for them and to the assurance of that 
horizon, all ontological interpretations are more like a groping about 
than an inquiry clear in its method. ? (Heidegger, 1988: 322) 
 
Broadhurst (2009) argues ƚŚĂƚ ‘dŚŝƌĚtĂǇ ? ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŐĂǀĞƌŝƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝƐŬ
ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ?ƚŚĂƚƉĞƌǀĂĚĞĚƚŚĞůĂŝƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ
conceptualised in terms of individuals, families, communities and 
populations deemed to be at risk with interventions targeted to prevent 
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those risks. She argues that while the focus on risk aims at increasing 
consistency and rigour in assessment this focus can conflate and obscure 
need as well as constraining and undermining professionalism through 
technicalising decision-making.  
 
What strikes me most in my conversations with social workers about risk is 
the lack of a clear understanding about what they mean by it and this is 
often reflected in the literature by an almost implicit nod to indicate that 
we all inherently share an understanding. I include here some examples 
about how social work is written about as indicative of the problem I am 
ƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐďƵƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŶŐĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ?
work. 
 
Preston-Shoot (2014) makes 60 references to risk in a book with only 186 
pages but never defines what he means by it. This is typical of a profession 
that is working on a shorthand assumption that we all understand and 
agree the construct of risk where in fact nothing could be further from the 
truth. Webb (2006:34) offers a loose definition of risk as:  
 
 “ QƚŚĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂƐƚŽǁŚĂƚƚŽ
do, with risk judgement being the degree of distance a course of 
action may be at from certain success. The concept of risk thus 
provides the basis for understanding the relation between judgment 
ĂŶĚƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ?
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Ferguson (2010) avoids really defining risk as such, even while making it a 
central feature of his work, other than to talk about practitioners 
experiencing risks and taking risks. Interestingly, he says that: 
 “ Qrisk in social work must be understood as not just being about 
danger and fear of blame for things going wrong. Notions of risk need 
to be recast in the positive terms of opportunity, courage, resilience, 
skill and creativity, thus making evident some of the core virtues that 
ƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌŬĞƌƐĞŶĂĐƚĚĂǇŝŶĚĂǇŽƵƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?-13) 
 
He is thus indicating that risk is currently being thought about as being 
only about danger and fear of blame rather than having any utilitarian 
value. He concludes that the notions of adventure, atmosphere, 
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚďůŽĐŬĞĚŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĨůŽǁĂŶĚĨůƵǆĂƌĞ “ƵƐĞĨƵůŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐ
ĨŽƌĐĂƉƚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚ ? ‘ůŝƋƵŝĚ ?ĂŶĚƵŶƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƌŝƐŬŝŶ
child protecƚŝŽŶ ? ?&ĞƌŐƵƐŽŶ ? 2010: 1113). Ferguson also recognises that 
the heightened awareness of risks, dangers and hazards create systemic 
conditions that keep social workers away from directly engaging with 
ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶĂŶĚĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐĂŶĚĐŚĂŝŶƚŚĞŵƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĚĞƐŬƚŽƉĐŽŵƉƵƚĞƌƐ ? “dŚĞ
risky kind of things social workers have to do on the streets and in the 
homes of difficult service users can make the office and even the most 
demanding computerised case recording systems seem very attractive 
ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĂůƐŽŚŽǁŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚions create defences 
against anxiety. 
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Holland (2004) argues that risk is not a concrete concept but is socially 
constructed. She argues that it cannot be a technical calculation but a way 
of thinking rather than a thing or set of realities. Social workers then have 
to construct a view on how risky an individual situation is. My tendency to 
agree with her will be later compromised by my arguments for the 
thingness ŽĨƌŝƐŬƵƐŝŶŐ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇďƵƚ/ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇĂŐƌĞĞǁŝƚŚŚĞƌ
argument linking risk management to accountability and the risk to the 
professional or organisation of being sued.  
 
Holt (2014: 54) says that social workers need to be able to step back and 
ďĞ “ĐůĞĂƌĂďŽƵƚƌŝƐŬ ?, but then assumes the procedural approach to risk 
typical of social work through her interpretation of the law in stating that 
 “where there is risk to the life of a child or a likelihood of serious harm, 
ůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ QƐŚŽƵůĚƵƐĞƚŚĞŝƌƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇƉŽǁĞƌƐƚŽĂĐƚ
quickly to secure the immediate safety of the chŝůĚ ? ?For the first time in 
ƚŚŝƐƉŝĞĐĞǁĞƐĞĞ ‘ƌŝƐŬ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ůŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚ ?ƵƐĞĚĂƐŝĨƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞƐǇŶŽŶǇŵƐ ?^ŽŵĞ
dictionary definitions of risk (e.g. Shorter Oxford English) include notions 
of dangerousness but also talk about risk as chance, possibility or 
likelihood. Yet it is the linkages between risk, hazard, harm that I would 
like to spend a little time thinking about for I believe that my opening 
stance that risk throws a fog on our thinking which leads to a state of 
anxiety rests on this discussion.  
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I would like to argue that we should think of a hazard as something that 
can cause harm; e.g. particular situations or behaviours of carers and 
children that have potential to cause harm to a child: a risk is the likelihood 
that any hazard will actually cause somebody harm; or the likelihood that 
the child will be exposed to the hazard and that exposure will cause harm. 
Risk aŶĚŚĂǌĂƌĚƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞƐǇŶŽŶǇŵƐĂŶĚ nor should risk and likelihood. 
More importantly - Harm is what the child may experience and is the thing 
that we should be trying to reduce. Risk is what the professionals 
experience for that is their pre-occupation. It deflects attention away from 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚƚŽĂĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĨŽƌŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐůŝĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ. This process of risk reification has created 
a situation where the likelihood becomes the object that falls under our 
gaze rather than the harm itself or the potential hazards that might cause 
the harm. Without understanding the hazards or the harm we are left 
generally aware that there is risk but not able to discuss what we mean by 
that or qualify it with any certainty thus leaving us in a state of anxiety. 
Delanty (1999 cited in Webb 2006:34) similarly describes risks within 
reflexive modernity as abstract and de-personalised and therefore not 
immediately observable. Risks are contrasted to dangers and natural 
hazards in that they are made by society; risks, he asserts, cannot be 
limited and are therefore not insurable or compensatable. 
 
In focusing on risk we also take our gaze away from needs and strengths 
and often fail to recognize resilience, ie. the qualities within the family 
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environment or developing child that mitigate against potential hazards 
resulting in actual harm. However, developmental growth is dependent 
upon taking risks and success involves risking failure. I ask: has our 
knowledge base become that of managing risk rather than understanding 
what contributes to hazards or harm? Is risk therefore a useful construct? 
 
This imprecision in language is contributing to our high anxiety levels and 
our low confidence in accurate prediction. What do we mean when we say 
for exampůĞƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂůŽƚŽĨƌŝƐŬ ? ?ŽƌƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŚŝŐŚůĞǀĞůŽĨ
riƐŬ ?? Both of these statements could mean that there is a high likelihood 
that one hazard may cause a small amount of harm. However, they may 
also mean that there are lots of potential hazards and the resulting harm 
to the child may be severe or even fatal. 
 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐWŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ ? 
 
 “dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƐƵĐŚƚŚŝŶŐĂƐthe one phenomenology, and if there could 
be such a thing it would never become anything like a philosophical 
technique. For implicit in the essential nature of all genuine method 
as a path toward the disclosure of objects is the tendency to order 
ŝƚƐĞůĨĂůǁĂǇƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƚĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƐ ? ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?
 
Heidegger is a tricky philosopher to use to look at social work due to his 
associations with ƚŚĞEĂǌŝƉĂƌƚǇ ?/ŶƵƐŝŶŐƐŽŵĞŽĨ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?s philosophy I 
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am in no way accepting or excusing his abhorrent political stance but nor 
will I attempt to disentangle his philosophy from his politics within this 
ƉĂƉĞƌ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?/ĚŽǁĂŶƚƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚ “ Q,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ
philosophy might bĞŽŶůǇĂƐƵďůŝŵĂƚĞĚƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ? Q ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽƌĞƚŚŝĐĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
ĨŽƌEĂǌŝƐŵ ? ? ?ŽƵƌĚŝĞƵ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?ĂŶĚƐŽĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝƚƐƵƐĞǁŝƚŚĐĂƵƚŝŽŶ ?zĞƚ/
reject the view that all ideas are necessarily tainƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŬĞƌ ?Ɛ
historically situated political views and, cautiously, attempt to cherry-pick 
some elements that I think may shed light on a specific current situation, 
which should by no means indicate that I accept the total work or any of 
the uses to which it may have been put. As Bourdieu (1991:1) also 
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐ ? “dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĚŽƵďƚůĞƐƐĨĞǁŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůƐǇƚĞŵƐŵŽƌĞ
profoundly rooted and dated by their times than Q thĞ ‘ƉƵƌĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŽĨ
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ?/ĨǁĞĂƌĞƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚĂƚŝƚƐŵŽƐƚďĂƐŝĐ ?,ĞŝĚ ŐŐĞƌ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ
Dasein as being-in-the-world then we have to recognise and note very 
strongly that the world in which Heidegger was being was Nazi Germany. 
 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐƚŚought features rarely in the social work literature and where 
it does there is a tendency for it to be focused around authenticity as 
being-toward death (Jirásek & Veselsky, 2013; Kominkiewicz, 2006). This 
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇŽĨ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛargues that only man knows and 
cares about his own mortality and therefore can be the only creature said 
to have being in the world or Dasein. <ŶŽǁŝŶŐĂŶĚĂĐĐĞƉƚŝŶŐŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
mortality enables you to choose what you will do with Dasein and 
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therefore leads to the possibility of authenticity. Other things or creatures 
simply exist.  
 
Heidegger (1953) coined human being as Dasein. In German, the word is 
made up of the words sein (being) and da (there). So, the literal translation 
ŝƐ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞďĞŝŶŐ ?Žƌ ?ĂŵŽƌĞŶŐůŽƉŚŽŶĞĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ,  ‘ďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?tĞƐĞĞ
immediately that for Heidegger, to be human is to be situated. Moran, 
 ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “dŚĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨDasein is always to be 
in a world. World here means a context, an environment, a set of 
references and assignmentƐǁŝƚŚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂŶǇŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŝƐůŽĐĂƚĞĚ ? ?/ƚŚŝŶŬ
ŚŝƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ŚĞƌĞŝƐŵŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚĂƐƚŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĂĨŽƌŵ
of being that has innate essential properties that my reading of Heidegger 
would argue against. Inwood (1997:19) suggests that Dasein is not a 
substance with an essential nature and properties and also that its 
potentiality or possibility is prior to its actuality. Dasein is not a definite 
actual thing but the possibility of various ways of being. According to 
Inwood, Heidegger accepts that there are limitations put on Dasein due to 
ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ “ǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚǇŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚďǇĨĂĐƚŝĐŝƚǇ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?
1953;192 cited in Inwood, 1997) but these circumstances and conditions 
ĂƌĞŶŽƚƐŝŵƉůǇ ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ-at-ŚĂŶĚƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ? ?/ĐĂŶƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ to them in 
various ways. As a bald person, I may refuse to accept that I am bald and 
opt for the comb-over; I might let it drive me to despair, I might wear a wig 
or celebrate my baldness with a daily polish.  
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,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬis often considered morbid ĂŶĚŝŶĚĞĞĚƌĞŶĚƚ ?Ɛ
emphasis on natality rather than mortality seems to offer more hope and 
belief in the possibilities of life (Smeeton, 2015). However, I think in 
stressing knowledge of the ultimate end point allows people freedom to 
make choices in how they get there and brings significance to existence. 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽDŽƌĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? “ĂƐĞŝŶŝƐƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ŵŽĚĞŽĨďĞŝŶŐŽĨ
humans, emphasising its individuality and its role in the disclosure of 
Being. Dasein does nŽƚũƵƐƚŽĐĐƵƌĨĂĐƚƵĂůůǇůŝŬĞƌŽĐŬƐĂŶĚƚƌĞĞƐ ?ŝƚ ?ƐĞŝŶŐŝƐ
an issue ĨŽƌŝƚ ? ?&ƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞǁŚĂƚŝƐƐƚƌĞƐƐĞĚin Being and 
Time is that humans care. For them to care, fully, they must accept that 
their being is in a world that is populated by other humans and by other 
things. I think this is summed up by Charles Taylor in the excellent 2010 
ZƵƐƉŽůŝĨŝůŵ “ĞŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞtŽƌůĚ ? P
 
 “dŚĞƌĞĂůůǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĞŶĚƐŽĨŚƵŵĂŶůŝĨĞĂƌĞŽŶůǇƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝďůĞŝĨǇŽƵ
ůĞƚǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨďĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚĂůůǇ ?- Charles Taylor (in 
Ruspoli, 2010) 
 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ fundamental analysis of Dasein is to show up the structure of 
being in the world, being with things and with others in such a way that its 
ǁŚŽůĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŝƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĚďǇĐĂƌĞ ? “Ɛ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌƉƵƚƐŝƚ ?ƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶƚŝĂů
meaning of dasein is care ? ? ?DŽƌĂŶ ? ? ?00:238) What we are able to see in 
Heidegger then is that Dasein is an existentially different way of being 
because human beings care about the quality of their existence and its 
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ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?,ƵŵĂŶƐĂƌĞŶŽƚƐŝŵƉůǇ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?
Their existence and the existence of others is significant to them. 
 
Heidegger also views Dasein as an active mode of being. According to 
/ŶǁŽŽĚ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? “DĂŶŝƐŶŽƚĂƉĂƐƐŝǀĞĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƌŽƵƐĞĚƚŽĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŽŶůǇďǇ
external stimuli; he is constantly up to somethiŶŐ ? ?dŚŝƐĐŚŝŵĞƐǁŝƚŚŵǇ
theme that one of tŚĞĚĂŶŐĞƌƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌŬ ?ƐƉƌĞoccupation with risk is 
that it often attempts to describe families as essential and fixed and 
therefore capable of being objectively described from the outside. This is 
an attempt by social workers to take themselves out of the world they are 
attempting to understand and to fail to realise that they are not describing 
passive creatures but lives that move on through people capable of 
bringing meaning to their own lives rather than have that meaning 
externally imposed. I also argue that a snapshot assessment of the state of 
ĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐůŝĨĞĂƚĂŶǇŽŶĞƉŽŝŶƚŝŶƚŝŵĞŝƐƵƐĞůĞƐƐĂƐƚŚĞǇ ‘ĂƌĞĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇƵƉ
ƚŽƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?dŚĂƚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŵĂǇďĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞŽƌŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞďƵƚŝƚŝƐ
certainly dynamic. The social work task therefore might be better served 
by being involved. Involvement is more than assessing, setting a plan for 
families to change by a certain timescale and then reviewing their progress 
against it. Involvement is about recognizing their capacity for meaning and 
to care about what is happening and to commit to ways of being that are 
not negatively impacting upon poor outcomes for themselves or others, 
then being alongside them in the process. Social Work has to care. 
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 “ĂƌĞŝƐĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝǀe to the significance of the world. Only if Dasein is 
care can it dwell in a significant world and only if it dwells in a 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚǁŽƌůĚĐĂŶĂƐĞŝŶďĞĐĂƌĞ ? ? ?/ŶǁŽŽĚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? 
 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐKŶƚŽůŽŐǇ 
 
Heidegger, according to Inwood (1997: 56), believed that ontology and 
phenomenology coincide, which echoeƐ,ƵƐƐĞƌů ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ^ĂƌƚƌĞ ?Ɛ 
(1958) phenomenological ontology. I will first of all look at what is meant 
ďǇŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇďĞĨŽƌĞĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŝƚĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐ
that approach in examining the thingness of risk. 
 
 “EŽĞŶƚŝƚǇǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ?Quine cited in Berto & Plebani 2015: 10) 
 
If we understand ontology in the Quinean way as simply a quest to 
catalogue everything there is, then it can be seen as preliminary to 
metaphysics. One first writes down the inventory of reality before 
wondering about its nature, structure and fundamental features. 
However, many philosophers use ontology and metaphysics as synonyms 
and talk about ontology as more than cataloguing reality but as a study of 
the fundamental and general structures of reality. (Berto & Plebani 2015: 
3-4). 
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ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽĞƌƚŽ ?WůĞďĂŶŝ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ
ĂƐĞŝŶ ?ƐďĞŝŶŐǁĂƐŝƌƌĞĚƵĐŝďůǇĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďĞŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐůŝŬĞ
animals, plants and artefacts to the extent that only Dasein can be said to 
exist, whereas other things can be said to live or that they plainly are. Risk 
then cannot be said to exist within this frame but we can still say that 
there is a something that we call risk. This paper will not take the 
discussion about ontological pluralism any further than that other than 
simply to acknowledge that there are opposing positions and that 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚďǇYƵŝŶĞĂƐŶŽŶƐĞŶƐĞ ?ĚŝƐŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ
it as a consequence of his doctrine that existence is expressed by 
quantification. I argue that risk is not quantifiable and as such could be 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŽŶŽƚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶYƵŝŶĞ ?ƐůŽŐŝĐ ?,ŽǁĞǀƌ ?/ǁŝůůĂƐƐĞƌƚƚŚĂƚ
risk is a phenomenon in the world that has an effect and as such will argue 
that it therefore has being even if that being is conspicuous, obtrusive and 
obstinate. I take here a Husserlian view that anything that presents itself 
to consciousness is potentially of interest to phenomenology, whether the 
object is real or imagined, empirically measurable or subjectively felt. (Van 
Manen 2014:94) Some things can be looked at ontologically even though 
they lack being (Berto & Plebani 2015: 3). Inwood (1997) suggests that 
before we deal with knowledge we need to consider the nature or the 
being of the object known. 
 
dŚĞ ?ƚŚŝŶŐŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨƌŝƐŬ 
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 “ĞŝŶŐƐŶĞĂƌĞƐƚĂƚŚĂŶĚĐĂŶďĞŵĞƚƵƉǁŝƚŚŝŶƚĂŬŝŶŐĐĂƌĞŽĨƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƐ
unusable, as improperly adapted for their specific use. Tools turn out 
to be damaged, their material unsuitable. In any case a useful thing of 
some sort is at hand here. But we discover the unusability not by 
looking and ascertaining properties, but rather by paying attention to 
the dealings in which we use it. When we discover its unusability, the 
thing becomes conspicuous. Conspicuousness presents the thing at 
ŚĂŶĚŝŶĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƵŶŚĂŶĚŝŶĞƐƐ ? ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?
 
/Ăŵ ‘ŐƌŽƉŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ ?ĨŽƌĂŶŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ ƌŝƐŬ ?/ƚŚĂƐŶŽ
physical substance. Nor is not a construct that specifically contains 
ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ĚƌĞĂŵŝŶŐ ?Žƌ ‘ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ?ƐǁĞ
have seen it has few easily agreed definitions other than it is a possibility. 
Yet it does, as we have seen, have an effect on the world. It is used to 
inform decisions as to what action should be taken within families where 
there is concern about the safety of a child. It causes an effect of anxiety 
for individuals, entire professions and organisations which creates a mood 
for practice decisions. Can we therefore ascribe it the status of a thing? 
According to Roche, ( ? ? ? ? P ? ? ‘ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐǇ QŵĂŬĞƐĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚŝƚƐ
ŽŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐ QƚŚĂƚŵĞŶƚĂůƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂŚĂǀĞĂƐƌĞĂůĂŶĚĂƐ
unavoidable an existĞŶĐĞ QĂƐŚĂǀĞƉŚǇƐŝĐĂůƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ?. In Heideggarian 
ontology as argued I am sure we can then ascribe it the status of thing. We 
must therefore look at the usefulness of this thing for, as we have seen, it 
is poorly understood and seems to have a problematic effect on those who 
Qualitative Social Work  
Final accepted version 24.10.18 
use it and, ĂƐ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ŚĂƐĂůƐŽƐĂŝĚ ? “&ĂƵůƚǇŝŶƚĞƌpretations, 
misunderstandings, put much more stubborn obstacles in the way of 
ĂƵƚŚĞŶƚŝĐĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂŶĂƚŽƚĂůŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞ ? ? 
 
DŽƌĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐĂƐŐ ǀŝŶŐƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇƚŽ
 ‘ǁŽƌŬ-ǁŽƌůĚƐ ?ĂƐĂǁĂǇŽĨĞǆƉůŝĐĂƚŝŶŐŽƵƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ďĞŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌůĚ ? ?KƵƌŝŶŝƚŝĂůĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚŽďũĞĐƚƐŝƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƵƐĞĂŶĚ
availability to us for certain assigned tasks which are generated by our 
interests. We engage with such objects according to their available being 
in relation to those tasks, what Heidegger calls Zuhandensein,  ‘ƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐƚŽ
ŚĂŶĚ ?ŽƌǁŚĂƚƌĞǇĨƵƐ(Ruspoli, 2010) ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĂƐ ‘ĂǀĂŝůĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ? 
 
HeideŐŐĞƌ ?ƐŽŶƚŽůŽŐǇƚĂŬĞƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽƌǁŽƌůĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚ
ĞǆŝƐƚƐǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶĚŝƚƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?,ĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚũƵƐƚƐĞĞĂƚ ďůĞ ?ŚĞƐĞĞƐthe table 
in this ƌŽŽŵǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĨŽƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂƚŽƌǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŽŶ ?,ĞĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƐĞĞŝƚĨŝƌƐƚĂƐĂ
rectangular piece of wood with four legs on the north side of the room, 
but perhaps positioned as too far from the light where he wrote his first 
book. Similarly, a craftsman does not primarily see his hammer as an entity 
with certain geometrical and physical properties, but as something for 
hammering. It also cannot be seen in isolation from other objects  W it is for 
hammering those nails into the shoes he is making. Objects that refer to 
ĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂƌĞĂůŵŽĨ ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ?ŝĨƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŽďũĞĐƚƐŽĨƵƐĞ W 
Žƌ ‘ƌĞĂĚǇƚŽŚĂŶĚ ?(zuhanden) as Heidegger puts it in contrast to entities 
ƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŵĞƌĞůǇ ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŚĂŶĚ ?(vorhanden). We rarely engage with 
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these things as objects in themselves, standing on their own and available 
for inspection. When we view them in a theoretical way we are on the 
road to science with a pure interest in examining things in the way they 
are, bracketed from their connections and engagements with ourselves. 
The important features of the hammer are not if it weighs 1kg or is 6 
inches long but if it is the right size for this craftsman to hammer these 
nails into these shoes. We make judgements based on usefulness and the 
appropriateness of things for the task. If we look at things simply in the 
theoretical mode they are vorhandene  W  ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŚĂŶĚ ?ŽƌƐŝŵƉůy 
 ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƵƐĞĨƵůƚŚŝŶŐĂƐĞƐƐĞ ƚŝĂůůǇ
 “ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ Q ? ? 
 
 “tŚĂƚŝƐƉĞĐƵůŝĂƌƚŽǁŚĂƚŝƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇĂƚŚĂŶĚŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁƐ ?ƐŽƚŽ
speak, in its character of handiness in order to be really handy. What 
every day dealings are initially busy with is not the tools themselves, 
but the work. What is to be produced in each case is what is primarily 
ƚĂŬĞŶĐĂƌĞŽĨĂŶĚŝƐƚŚƵƐĂůƐŽǁŚĂƚŝƐĂƚŚĂŶĚ ? ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? 
 
Temporality is also always present. The craftsman while hammering 
implicitly looks ahead to the completed shoes he will have made and 
backwards to the time he learned the skills he needs to complete them. 
However, these things are not necessarily to mind. A craftsman engrossed 
ŝŶƚŚĞƚĂƐŬŽĨŚĂŵŵĞƌŝŶŐŝƐŶ ?ƚ thinking about the hammer or the nails, nor 
necessarily about the customers for whom he is making the shoes. These 
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things are there for him and he is tacitly aware but they are inconspicuous 
and unobtrusive. He sees them but they are not necessarily his focus as 
long as they are within this web of significance; the hammer is behaving as 
it always should, the nails are where he expects to find them, the leather is 
responding in the way it always should. They only become conspicuous if 
something goes awry, the head falls off the hammer or the leather runs 
out or the nails are not in their usual place when he reaches for them. 
Heidegger, according to Inwood (1997), thought that the craftsman can be 
as inconspicuous to himself as the things around him, barely aware of 
ŚŝŵƐĞůĨĂƐĂŶĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚĂŐĞŶƚůĞƚĂůŽŶĞĂƐĂŶ ‘ĞŐŽ ? ?,ĞŵĂǇĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ
himself if something goes wrong but rarely spends time noticing himself in 
the world. Heidegger felt that it was a persistent mistake of philosophers 
to make things too conspicuous P ‘ǁŚĞŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽŶĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŝƐƚĂŬĞŶĂƐ
the basic structure of consciousness, being in the world is characterised far 
ƚŽŽĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇĂŶĚƐŚĂƌƉůǇ ? ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?2005: 1023-24). 
 
So, risk has become conspicuous. Its usefulness is clearly in question. As 
we have seen from the social work literature, when social workers reach 
ĨŽƌŝƚƚŚĞǇĨŝŶĚŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƋƵŝƚĞĚŽƚŚĞũŽďƚŚĞǇŶĞĞĚŝƚƚŽĚŽ ?KƌŝŶŝƚƐƵƐĞŝƚ
has other effects upon the task other than helping to understand the 
likelihood that a specific child may be harmed by a specific hazard. It 
purports, within child protection social work, to be a construct that should 
do only that yet it also brings anxiety about decision-making that causes 
that process to be shifted around within organisational management 
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structures. Kemshall (2010:1256; cited in Stanford, 2011) believes that 
ƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌŬĞƌƐĂƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽŐŝǀĞŝŶƚŽ ‘ĨĂƚĂůŝƐŵ QƚƌĂƉƉĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƌŝƐŬ-prone 
ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐŝĞƐĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽƌŝƐŬ ? ?^ƚĂŶĨŽƌĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶŽƚĞƐ
that the emotion of risk she identifies in her study is the emotion of fear 
which, she argues, interrupts even the most determined efforts towards 
progressive action. I would argue that there is also anxiety about the 
ethical considerations that its use brings when removing children from 
their birth families based upon value judgments that inevitably fall back on 
the perceived danger that certain human conditions may contain: e.g. the 
parents learning disability: mental ill health; living in poverty; their own 
care history. Stanford (2011) finds that risk, rather than being a calculable 
object is steeped in these ethical and moral issues that lead to risk 
decisions. 
 
Risk is not in itself a tool but a construct that brings with it a variety of 
tools, such as assessment protocols, risk indicators, recidivism scales; yet it 
is claimed as a useful thing. So, let us look at the usefulness of risk. 
 
 “/ĨĂůůǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŝƐĂŚĂŵŵĞƌ ?ĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐůŽŽŬƐůŝŬĞĂŶĂŝů ? ?DĂƐůŽǁ ?
1966) 
 
We see that risk is not ready to hand as we cannot use it without 
theorising. Broadhurst et Ăů ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĂƚ “the informal logics 
of risk that are so central to professional practice are under-emphasised 
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and under-ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐĞĚ ?. We must therefore acknowledge that risk is 
unready to hand. Heidegger described things that are unready to hand as 
either: conspicuous  W itself damaged; obtrusive  W a part is missing; or 
obstinate  W it is in itself a hindrance. This approach has been used in other 
phenomenologies relating to the professions (e.g. Carel, 2015) 
 
I believe that what risk preoccupation has done is to take our gaze away 
from the lived experiences of those we claim to be helping. Helm (2011) 
ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŚŝůĚ ?ƐůŝǀĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝƐŶ ?ƚĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞůǇĂŶĚĞŵƉĂƚŚŝĐĂůůǇ
represented in professional assessments due to contemporary policy and 
practice developments which focus on explicit analytical judgement and 
take less account of what children are actually saying. Risk is therefore 
obstinate in the Heideggarian sense in that it is actually hindering our 
ability to see things from the perspective of our primary client. Instead we 
focus on ourselves. 
 
Ferguson (2010: 1101) ĂƌŐƵĞƐ “ƚŚĂƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐŽĨƌŝƐŬŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞ
grounded much more in the lived experience of social work and what 
social workers actually do, where they do it and how they must use their 
 ?ŵŽďŝůĞ ?ďŽĚŝĞƐĂŶĚƐĞŶƐĞƐŝŶĚŽŝŶŐƐŽ ? ?His invocation here of Merleau-
WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞďŽĚǇŝƐƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨ
the perceived world particularly through the senses, locates his work 
phenomenologŝĐĂůůǇ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚŝƐŝƐŶ ?ƚĨƵůůǇĞǆƉůŽƌĞĚĂƐ&ĞƌŐƵƐŽŶ
chooses to use a mobilities framework for his work, which provides some 
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ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ “ǀŝƐĐĞƌĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨĚŽŝŶŐƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌŬ ?
(Ferguson 2009: 474). However, the actuality of risk, other than something 
experienced by social workers, remains unexplained. Future work will seek 
to explore how embodied social work practitioners experience risk, but 
Heidegger compels us to first deal with the thing itself.  
Ferguson goes on to argue for writing about social work to include 
 ‘ĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƐƚŚĞƚĞǆƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĨĞĞůŽĨƚŚĞůŝǀĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ
of social work which impacts upon perception and what does and does not 
get done. He classifies risks as either: systemic, that contribute to how 
social work is organised and delivered; or practice, which involve the doing 
of child protection social work including the decisions social workers take 
about whether to examine children, ask specific questions of carers and 
the many other actions and movements made in relation to protecting 
children. Ferguson describes risks as being experienced by workers in 
particular places eg. the street, the car, the service users ? home. We 
ƐŚŽƵůĚ ?ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐ ?ƐĞĞŬƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇůŝǀĞĚ
experiences of practice and the risks involved. 
 
Here we see a recognition first of all that social workers are embodied and 
practising in a real-ǁŽƌůĚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƚŚĂƚĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐĞƐ ‘ĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞ ?ŽƌǁŚĂƚ/
ǁŝůůŐŽŽŶƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂƐ ‘ŵŽŽĚ ? ?ƵƚǁĞĂůƐŽƐĞĞƚŚĂƚŝŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽut risk 
we have turned our gaze away from the service user and onto the 
professional. It is the social worker who is experiencing risk. The child does 
not experience risk. They experience harm or the fear of harm (which is in 
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itself harmful). Parents whose parenting causes concern do not experience 
risk. If they did have concern for the potential harm to children and had 
the capacity to address that then social workers would not be involved. 
Parents are often caught up dealing with their own life-worlds that may in 
themselves be problematic to a point that they are unavailable to have 
concern for their children ?ƐƐĂĨĞƚǇ ?ZŝƐŬŝƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚ by the professionals 
and their organisations who are keen to avoid the potential consequences 
to themselves of risk decisions. 
 
Mood - Stimmung 
 
As I have highlighted above, what I find particularly attractive about 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐƚŚĂƚŚĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƐƚŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨĐĂƌŝŶŐ ?,ƵŵĂŶ
beings find it hard to come to understanding anything unless they care 
about it  W that it matters. One must care in order to acquire knowledge 
and to will, wish or strive for anything one must already care in advance. 
Heidegger describes Dasein as we have seen: as ahead of itself, it is its 
possibilities; already in the world within specific situations that determines 
the possibilities open to it; alongside entities within the world  W it is 
engaged with the world. 
 
However, one of the consequences of caring is that one might experience 
adverse emotions such as fear or anxiety (Ratcliffe, 2013). If one did not 
care then fear and anxiety would struggle to exist. I argue that within 
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social work they not only exist but predominate. Ferguson (2010:1106) 
states that: 
 
 “ƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌŬŝŶǀŽůǀĞƐǁĂůŬŝŶŐŝŶĂŶĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞŽĨƚĞŶƐŝŽŶĂŶĚ
sometimes menace, pervaded by uncertainty, anxiety, fear and 
ĂĚǀĞŶƚƵƌĞ Q^ŽĐŝĂůtŽƌŬŝƐǁĂůŬŝŶŐĂƐĂŶĂĚǀĞŶƚƵƌĞ PƵƉƚŚĞƐƚĂŝƌǁĂǇŽĨ
high-rise flats, up the path to the home in anticipation of the visit; 
crossing the threshold of the home; and then getting out again. Even 
walking from the office to the car to make the journey can provoke 
ĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĚĞĞƉĞŵŽƚŝŽŶ ? ?
 
We need to understand the differentiation between fear and anxiety if we 
ĂƌĞƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ĨŽŐ ?ĂŶĂůŽŐǇƐŽŚĞƌĞĐŽŵĞƐŵǇĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƚƵƌŶŽŶ the 
fog lights again.  
 
dŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ “ĂƐĞŝŶŝƐĂůǁĂǇƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇŝŶĂŵŽŽĚ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?
shows that mood is a crucial element for Heidegger as he goes on to argue 
that mŽŽĚŵĂŬĞƐŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ “ŚŽǁŽŶĞŝƐĂŶĚŝƐĐŽŵŝŶŐĂůŽŶŐ ? ?ĞŝŶŐŝŶĂ
ŵŽŽĚ “ďƌŝŶŐƐďĞŝŶŐƚŽŝƚƐ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĂƐĞŝŶ ?
Heidegger thought that the impact of mood on Dasein was important in 
that when one is in a bad mood, Dasein becomes blind to itself and the 
 “ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐǁŽƌůĚŽĨŚĞĞĚĨƵůŶĞƐƐŝƐǀĞŝůĞĚ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐger, 1953: 133). This 
ŵĂŬĞƐŝƚŚĂƌĚĨŽƌŽŶĞƚŽ ‘ƚĂŬĞĐĂƌĞ ?ĂŶĚƉĂǇƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
being-in-the-world. Hence, my driving through fog analogy. 
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Moods differ from emotions, which concern particular entities. I am angry 
about something or with someone. But if I am in an irritable mood I need 
not be irritable about anything in particular. If moods are directed at 
anything they are directed at the world rather than entities within it. 
Anxiety casts a pall over the world in contrast to fear in the face of a 
specific threat. Moods are hardly within our control. I can control my 
behaviours and to a certain extent my emotions, but moods come and go 
unresponsive to our direction. Heidegger uses the word befindlichkeit 
ǁŚŝĐŚƌŽƵŐŚůǇƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞƐĂƐ ‘ŚŽǁŽŶĞ ĨŝŶĚƐŽŶĞƐĞůĨ ?Žƌ ‘ŚŽǁŽŶĞŝƐĚŽŝŶŐ ? ?
The more usual German word for mood is stimmung which also means the 
tuning of a musical instrument, which Heidegger exploits in order to think 
of mood as being attuned in a certain way. Dasein is never moodless any 
more than it is unconcerned.  
 
Moran (2000) claims that Heidegger sharply distinguishes fear from 
anxiety. Fear is always fear of something, and for the sake of something. I 
might be afraid of the dogs my service users own or be afraid that a 
particular child may be harmed by a particular parent. Fear therefore has 
directedness. Anxiety, however, is shapeless and does not have a precise 
object. Anxiety is precisely anxiety over nothing, that is no object other 
than our very being-in-the-ǁŽƌůĚŝƚƐĞůĨ ? “ĞŝŶŐĂŶǆŝŽƵƐĚŝƐĐůŽƐĞƐ ?
primordially and directly, the world ĂƐǁŽƌůĚ ? ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?
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Heidegger (1953) also talks about fearing involving others and this speaks 
directly to the social work encounter with risk ?,ĞƚĂůŬƐĂďŽƵƚ ‘ĨĞĂƌŝŶŐ
ĨŽƌ Q ?ŶŽƚƚĂŬŝŶŐĂǁĂǇƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?s fear from him, recognising that when we 
are afraid for another there is no expectation that they have to have any 
ĨĞĂƌŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƉĂƌƚ ?ŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨĨĞĂr for themselves can be 
precisely what informs our fear for them.  It is a mode of co-attunement 
but not necessarily being afraid with them or even being afraid together. 
 
,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐǁĂǇŽĨǀŝĞǁŝŶŐmood not as a psychological subjective state, 
but as a way the world itself appears is a useful one for the purpose of this 
paper (Moran, 2000:241). I argue that social work as a profession has a 
default mood of anxiety. This anxiety arises because we care about doing 
the right thing in our interactions and interventions with our service users. 
It matters to us to get it right and we are constantly in this state of feeling 
anxious because we have a great deal of freedom to act without any clear 
instructions or guidance about what is the best thing to do or when to do 
it. Rather than accepting the existential nature of the profession and the 
need for phronesis rooted in a knowledge base of praxis, we seek to 
manage this anxiety in two ways: by developing processes and procedures 
that clearly delineate next steps; and by dislocating ourselves from 
engagement with the people we work with through a risk narrative, which 
replaces anxiety with fear (e.g. fear that a child may be harmed). The risk 
narrative offers us some reassurance that our work has directedness - our 
job is to protect the child from harm. However, the complex 
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interrelationships between strengths, resilience, weaknesses and family 
dynamics in a complex web of environmental, psychological and social 
factors that mitigate or heighten the likelihood of harm overwhelms us. 
We are therefore left with undirected anxiety that something is going to 
go wrong which potentially leads us to play safe and disengage. 
Proceduralisation and the increasing use of tools in assessment lead us 
towards a belief that we are thinking objectively and rationally, ignoring 
Merleau-WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŝŐŶŽƌĞƐƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆ
 ‘ŵŝůŝĞƵ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŚƵŵĂŶŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĐŽŵĞƐƚŽĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? “ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ
ŝƐƵŶĂǁĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĐŝƚĞĚŝŶDŽƌĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? We 
are also tempted into believing that the situation that presents itself to us 
within families is fixed and unchanging. Merleau-Ponty would argue that 
the congealing of temporal thinking into language and concepts acts to fix 
meanings, to give the appearance of absoluteness (Moran, 2000: 405). 
Families are therefore left pinned to a set of meanings ascribed to them by 
the social work assessment that may leave little scope for change and 
agency. Saltiel (2015) also describes social work decision-making as taking 
place within professional contexts marked by high-levels of professional 
anxiety. He argues that there is an increasing understanding that actuarial 
tools have limited usefulness and that decision-making tends to favour 
heuristic reasoning. What is also clear is that the risk pre-occupation not 
only has a negative impact upon service users but also upon social workers 
themselves. 
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 “ZŝƐŬƐŽĐŝĞƚǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇůŝĨĞŝƐƐĂƚƵƌĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ
considerations of risk, resulting in increased anxiety, uncertainty and 
ĞǀĞŶĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶ ? ?tĞďď ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?
 
Conclusion 
 
Social Work is situated within the  ‘ƌŝƐŬƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? (Beck, 1992) so it is hardly 
surprising that the prŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶƚĂŬĞƐŽŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐƉƌĞoccupation. I believe 
that preoccupation with risk and search for certainty lulls us into 
dependence upon procedure and process using flawed tools arising from 
an obstinate construct. 
 
By what I hope is helpful discrimination against buying into the whole 
package of Heidegger, I have picked out what I think are some useful ideas 
for looking at the ontology of risk, not necessarily by its physical substance 
but by its usefulness as a construct and have found it not only wanting but 
an active hindrance to effective social work. By arguing that risk is not a 
monster that we need to engage in combat but just a flawed construct 
that fogs our thinking, I have tried to consider the impact of risk on service 
ƵƐĞƌƐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌŬĞƌƐĂůŝŬĞďǇĨŝƌƐƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ
about being-in-the-world. Heidegger however lacks discussion about the 
body which is sharply contrasted by Delancey (2009:369) to Merleau-
WŽŶƚǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƐĂƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇďŽĚŝůǇ W “ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚŚĞŝƌďŽĚŝĞƐĂŶĚ
ŚŝƐďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚďĞŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚŝƐŽŶůǇƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂďŽĚǇ ? ?Future 
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work will therefore re-consider &ĞƌŐƵƐŽŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬĂŶĚ how embodiment 
changes social work practice. I hope through all of this that I have 
sustained an argument that phenomenology has real value for thinking 
about and indeed practicing social work and believe that there is capacity 
to explore it further. 
 
I have also argued that this pre-occupation with risk creates a mood for 
ƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŵŽŽĚŝƐĂŶǆŝĞƚǇ ?/ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚŝŶŐ ‘ĂŶǆŝĞƚǇ ?ǁŝƚŚ ‘ĨĞĂƌ ?
I have tried to draw attention to the lack of direction in this mood which 
clouds our judgments however, only the reader can conclude if I have 
indeed turned the fog lights on and allowed a glimpse through the fog of 
risk, or if I have turned it into a pea-souper.  
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